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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS THE INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDIES  
 
Abstract. It is undeniable that economic sanctions have become an international relations 
tool of choice in the post-bipolar era. The range of nations that have become targets of this 
foreign policy instrument is growing month by month, as is the list of those states applying the 
sanctions. This rush to sanction has generated a great deal of criticism in both academic circles 
and among the multinational firms that are typically the bearers of a large part of the implicit 
taxation that economic sanctions represent. It is a reasonable generalization to characterize 
international economic sanctions as overused, ineffective, and unfair. Nevertheless, this 
characterization of sanctions is a generalization. In order to more fully understand what should 
be used and what should not, what is effective and what is not, and what is fair and what is not, 
a better understanding of what economic sanctions do is necessary. The article surveys the 
definitional issues of the economic sanctions in the international relations theory. It opens with 
a review of the conceptual background of the economic sanctions through the prism of the 
methodological approaches of political realism, liberalism and constructivism and then goes on 
to explore the variables of the efficiency of economic sanctions as foreign policy tool. In 
conclusion, we discuss the suggestions for perspectives of further research and development of 
economic sanctions in the foreign policy analysis.  
 
Introduction. 
General statement of problem. For the past twenty five years economic sanctions 
acquired growing prominence in foreign policy of the great powers. The US, the EU, China 
and Japan employ economic sanctions in responding to the Iranian and North Korean 
nuclear crises that threaten their security. Economic sanctions these are means of great 
powers by which they seek to influence the behavior of target states, to demonstrate 
leadership, to resolve international conflict and to express common values. The growing 
centrality of economic sanctions is partially a reaction to the limits of military power 
exposed during difficult and protracted operations inside the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Moreover, military interventions in the 
postbipolar international relations are difficult to justify.  Without any challenger on the 
horizon, it is highly unclear what constitutes a threat to national security that needs to be 
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addressed with military force together with its inherent sacrifices in life and expenditure. In 
J. Galtung’s terms: “When military action is impossible for one reason or another… 
economic sanctions serve as a clear signal to everyone that what the receiving nation has 
done is disapproved of” [Galtung, 1967]. Above all, because economic rather than military 
strength is increasingly seen by states as the prime determinant of international power, 
economic sanctions may begin to assume an even more prominent role. 
Recent researches and publications. Notwithstanding the fact that the debate on 
the nature of economic sanctions has been in existence for five decades, the investigation 
on their efficacy has not yielded satisfactory results. Scientists in the West have long 
argued that there is no automatic link between the effectiveness of economic sanctions in 
inflicting economic pain and in compelling policy changes in the target. D. Drezner, B. 
de Neuilly, C. Portela, emphasize that sanctions regimes with a remarkable economic 
impact have failed to induce changes in the conduct of target non-democratic states. 
D. Drezner, conversely, stresses that mere threat of economic sanctions has sometimes 
succeeded in bringing about the desired policy change [Drezner, 1999]. Ukrainian 
scientists S. Galaka [Galaka, 2003], V. Pahil [Pahil, 2000], and S. Romanenko 
[Romanenko, 2001] are strong supporters of this wide-spread concept. Works by 
contemporary researchers on issues related to the economic sanctions and financial 
statecraft, among whom are Margaret Doxy [Doxy, 1971], Richard N. Haass [Haass, 
1998], Zachary Selden [Selden, 1999], Brendan Taylor [Taylor, 2010], play an important 
role in understanding the nature of economic coercion in foreign policy making, but they 
say a very little on how to estimate the economic sanctions effectiveness. Thus, the 
determinants for the success and failure of economic sanctions have not been ascertained. 
The inherent difficulty of the task has been further compounded by a transformation of 
the instrument itself in the contemporary system of international relations. 
Purposes of article. The purpose of this article is to analyze the nature of 
economic sanctions as the tool of foreign policy within the international relations theory, 
because this instrument is becoming increasingly central to shaping strategic outcomes in 
the XXI century. After addressing some essential definitional questions, we will try to 
outline the progress is made in international relations scholarships in identifying the 
determinants of the success of economic sanctions.  
 
1. Conceptualization of economic sanctions in the international relations theory 
Main research results. At first, we will try to conceptualize the definition of the 
economic sanctions in the international relations theory. There is no generally accepted 
definition of economic sanctions. The term “economic sanctions” is one of the more 
confused and confusing to have entered the lexicon and discourse of international 
politics. Part of the ambiguity surrounding the term stems from the fact that the word 
“sanctions” in everyday usage carries multiple meanings.  
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According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, the term can connote the granting 
of official permission or approval and, at the same time, a penalty or punishment for 
disobeying a law or rule [Taylor, 2010: 11]. Confusion also results from the tendency of 
many scholars to use the term “sanctions” interchangeably with a raft of other 
descriptors, such as “economic statecraft”, “economic coercion”, “economic warfare”, 
“economic diplomacy” [Weintraub, 1982: X]. In the view of the above different 
definitions of economic sanctions we will analyze more thoroughly.  
For instance, Daniel Drezner, a towering figure who made path breaking and 
enduring contributions to political analysis of the economic sanctions, the author of the 
“sanctions paradox”, defines economic sanctions as “the threat or act by a nation-state or 
coalition of nation-states, called the sender, to disrupt economic exchange with another 
nation-state, called the target, unless the targeted country acquiesces to an articulated 
political demand” [Drezner, 1999: 2]. R.J. Ellings ascertains economic sanctions as the 
governmental policies that cut or curtail economic relations in order to coerce the target 
country(ies) into behaving in accordance with the sanctioner’s(s’) objectives [Ellings, 
1991: 16]. G. Lopez and D. Cortright qualify economic sanctions as the “coercive foreign 
policy action of a nation(s) in which it intentionally suspends customary economic 
relations such as trade and/or financial exchanges in order to prompt the targeted nation 
to change its policy or behavior [Lopez and Cortright, 1998: 15]. N. Crawford determines 
economic sanctions as “the denial of customary interactions (strategic, economic, or 
social); they are intended to promote social, political, or economic change in a target 
state” [Crawford, 1999: 5]. According to J. Blanchard, N. Ripsman and Shambaugh, 
economic sanctions strategy is the particular form of the coercive foreign policy in which 
a state disrupts its normal economic relations with another state in order to achieve one of 
the following objectives: (1) to induce the targeted state to change its behavior; (2) to 
generate popular pressure on the government that causes it to change its policies; or (3) to 
provoke a coup or revolt that leads to the emergence of a new government that will act in 
accordance with the sanctioning state’s wishes [Blanchard, Ripsman 2000: 219; 
Shambaugh 1999: 4]. Rennack evaluates economic sanctions like “coercive measures 
imposed by one country, or coalition of countries, against another country, its 
government or individual entities therein, to bring about a change in behavior or policies 
[Rennack 2000]. American theorist in economic sanctions policy M. O’Sullivan 
characterizes economic sanctions as the deliberate withdrawal of normal trade or 
financial relations for foreign policy purposes [O’Sullivan, 2003: 12]. 
Theorists in international politics distinguish economic sanctions from economic 
wars. For instance, R. Pape illustrates the difference between these two categories. 
According to the scientist, economic sanctions “seek to lower the economic welfare of a 
target state by reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government to 
change its political behaviour” [Pape, 1997: 93-94].  
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By contrast, an economic war takes place “when a state threatens to inflict 
economic harm… in order to persuade the target state to agree to terms of trade more 
favorable to the coercing state” [Pape, 1997: 94].  
Economic sanctions operate in a similar way to military warfare. Both share the 
same end, the “political disintegration of the enemy so that he gives up the pursuit of his 
goals. The method used is value deprivation” [Galtung, 1967: 386]. The theory foresees a 
roughly proportionate relation between both phenomena: the more intense the value-
deprivation, the more widespread the political disintegration in the target state. J. Galtung 
explains: “The idea is that there is a limit to how much value deprivation the system can 
stand, and that once this limit is reached (resulting in a split in leadership or between 
leadership and people), then political disintegration will proceed very rapidly and will 
lead to surrender or willingness to negotiate” [Galtung, 1967: 388]. 
Thus, two central definitional elements can be discerned in the concept of 
economic sanctions: the coercive measures need to be economic in nature and its aim 
needs to be political. It is necessary to note that the basic methodological approaches to 
the study of the nature of economic sanctions as the tool of foreign policy formed over 
decades within the paradigm of realism, liberalism and constructivism. 
Realism is concerned with the efficient use of economic sanctions for the pursuit 
of national interests. Realists conceptualize (economic) sanctions not as punishment on 
illegal or immoral acts but as a state’s foreign-policy instrument used for the pursuit of 
national egoistic interests. In classical definition of the realism, sanctions entail “the 
deliberate government-inspired withdrawal of trade or financial relations to obtain 
foreign policy goals” [Hufbauer, 1985: 2]. James Barber defined economic sanctions 
simply as “economic measures directed to political objectives” [Barber, 1979: 367].  
Realist scholars of economic sanctions assume that: 1) a primary sanctioner in 
world politics is not a collective international actor as international organization, but 
state; 2) economic sanctions are not measure of law enforcement but a foreign policy 
instrument; 3) the key role of economic sanctions on the world stage is not to reduce the 
number of deviant acts but is to coerce the target state to fulfill a sanctioning country 
wishes; 4) economic sanctions are realized in the anarchical international system which 
consists of states as the primary actors. Realists explain the nature of economic sanctions 
through the logic of power, interests, and rationality. All are attributes of states’ power, 
not of structure. In this context E. H. Carr notes that “The economic weapon is pre-
eminently the weapon of strong powers” [Sedliar, 2013: 72]. Hossein G. Askari, for 
instance, emphasizes: “The imposition of economic sanctions, whether in the form of 
embargoes, blockades, or other economic restrictions, requires the accompanying 
resources and means to enforce the sanctions and that the sender country commands 
significant influence over commercial activities. This is a capacity of the largest and most 
powerful nation-states and international entities.  
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Yet, the asymmetry of power does not negate a small state’s use of economic 
sanctions” [Askari, 2003: 4]. Thus, realists assume that a state is more or less rational 
actor. Without this assumption realists cannot explain the asymmetrical use of economic 
sanctions among states. This is because the majority of states’ non-use of economic 
sanctions cannot be explained solely by the logic of opportunity. It is not physically 
difficult for small states to stop or restrict import from or export to another country. It is 
also hard to believe that conflicts of interests between a small state and a big power do 
not exist. Then, why does not the former impose economic sanctions on the latter? 
Realists must argue that this is because policymakers in a small state are not irrational 
enough to have the willingness to impose economic sanctions that are unlikely to be 
successful for changing target’s behaviors. The rationality assumption is the hard core of 
realist approach [Седляр, 2013: 72-75]. 
On the other hand, liberalists borrowed their ideas of economic sanctions from 
municipal laws. Overall, the nature of economic sanctions within liberalism can be 
characterized by the following provisions: 1) economic sanctions should be applied by 
the international organization in order to maintain international peace and security. For 
instance, Quincy Wright claimed that the use of sanctions must be authorized by an 
international organization [Wright, 1965: 206]. Liberalists argue that the United Nations 
Security Council applies economic sanctions to deal with four different categories of 
threats to international peace and security: 1) armed conflict between states; 2) armed 
conflict within states; 3) international norm-breaking states (the so-called “rouges”); and 
4) international terrorism [Charron, 2011: 1-8]; 2) economic sanctions are applied in the 
international system which is not anarchical, but should be understood as community that 
is composed of state  and none-state actors who share common interests; 3) economic 
sanctions should be governed not by power politics but by the rule of law; 4) the use of 
the mechanism of economic coercion should be regulated not by the balance of power but 
by collective security [Седляр, 2013: 71]. How does collective economic sanctions 
system work? M.S. Daoudi and M.S. Dajani summarize liberal arguments articulated in 
the interwar period concisely: 
1. The balance of power system is dead. It has failed to prevent wars and 
maintain the peace. What is the alternative? 
2. By the establishment of an international organization. How will this system 
enforce the law without military conflicts? 
3. By the establishment of international economic sanctions. This weapon is 
powerful, effective, relatively cheap, bloodless, and moreover, easy to use to bring any 
aggressor to knees. 
4. Economic sanctions have a moral power. They enjoy universal public support. 
5. States are innately rational. With the economic threat hanging over their 
heads, they will not find it worthwhile to deliberately wage wars aggression. 
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6. Neutrality is a precarious concept which the community of nations needs to 
abandon [Daoudi and Dajani, 1983: 18-19]. 
Liberal ideas of economic sanctions were based on domestic analogy. As Kim 
Richard Nossal notes, “The 'League experiment' was explicitly designed to bring the 
conditions of domestic order to the international system. A set of rules was laid out in the 
Covenant; transgressors were threatened with the imposition of clearly specified hurtful 
penalties if they broke the 'law'; and the penalties were to be exacted by an institution that 
was supposed to come as close to being an international public authority as possible. The 
penalties against a Covenant breaking state - harms legitimized by the international 
community - had all of the structural properties of punishment as we know it in a 
domestic context” [Nossal, 1989: 310-311].  
Member-states must prioritize collective interests over national interests for 
maintaining collective security system. As Arnold Wolfers notes, “it was the basic 
assumption of all collectivist thinking that with the establishment of the League of 
Nations a universal community of nations had come into existence, to be the acting center 
of world affairs. The individual sovereign nations were merely the parts of an embracing 
whole, to which they and their inhabitants owed loyalty. National interests in the 
traditional sense of the word, therefore, should be subordinated to the interests of the 
community” [Wolfers: 1962: 268-9]. 
Liberalists assume the existence of laws and/or norms for the constitution of 
economic sanctions. According to liberal paradigm, there are no economic sanctions 
without common norms or laws that specify deviant behaviors. The distinction between 
coercion and sanctions is important in liberal paradigm. The possession of coercive 
power is not a sufficient, albeit necessary, condition for the resort to sanctions. Sanctions 
are coercive acts but not all coercive acts are sanctions. Sanctions are coercion that is 
used for promoting common interests. All coercive acts from self-interest are treated as 
acts of hostility, not sanctions. Liberalists believe that norms or laws must preexist for the 
exercise of sanctions because they work as constitutive rules that specify which practices 
are counted as legitimate coercion, that is, sanctions. Liberal scholars of sanctions 
consider that economic sanctions are modern phenomena. States started to engage in the 
practice of sanctions, they believe, only after international system was transformed into 
international society [Koga, 2005: 45-49]. 
At last, constructivism as the methodological approach in the international 
relations theory holds the view that: economic sanctions are not objective phenomenon, 
but the social construction is shaped by shared ideas as well as material forces; economic 
sanctions are based on the identities and interests of political actors are shaped primarily 
by shared ideas [Wendt, 1999: 1]. Constructivism does not specify empirical puzzles, the 
nature of economic sanctions, international system, key political actors in international 
society, their preferences, and the logic of actions in international politics.  
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This is what Alexander Wendt calls “a variation question” of constructivist 
analysis [Wendt, 1999].To paraphrase his expression, there is no such thing as “logic”. 
That is why there is no logic in economic sanctions. Thus, economic sanctions are not a 
brutal fact, nor rational fact. They are social entity that cannot be reduced to material 
entity. In other words, economic sanctions are the means by which social construction of 
reality has been created. What is the main goal of economic sanctions in international 
policy? According to constructivists, the sanction strategy is aimed to ensure common 
values in the international society but not in the international system which is based on 
the power balance whether normative rules of the international institutions.  
 
2. Efficiency of economic sanctions in international relations studies 
Theorists in international politics are primarily interested in answering two 
questions: 1) do economic sanctions work?; and 2) under what conditions do economic 
sanctions work? The determinants of the efficiency of economic sanctions in 
international relations studies could be characterized by the following provisions: 
- economic sanctions are to be designed to maximize pressure on the culpable 
actors, to inflict pain and suffering upon the leaders whose policy the sender tries to 
influence. Sanctions should be appropriately targeted to minimize humanitarian impact 
on population in the objective state; 
- the evidence from the cases suggests that the presence of political opposition in the 
target which oriented on sanctioning state makes economic sanctions more fruitful. The 
political groups that lose from economic sanctions will find themselves in a financially 
diminished position, which may reduce their political influence. The “fifth column” effect is 
probable response of groups in the political elite of the target to economic sanctions and that 
rely on imports or export-oriented producers;  
- scientists in international relations stress that economic sanctions are of limited 
utility in achieving foreign policy goals like regime change and democratization. The 
security, political or other costs of complying with the sender demands may simply be higher 
than any pain that can be imposed with economic sanctions. That is why economic sanctions 
succeed if they are designed to achieve moderate political goals in the target; 
- multilateral cooperation among the sanctioning states is a necessary and/ or 
sufficient condition for generating a successful outcome. In this regard, scientists in 
international politics have observed that cooperation problems can be parsed into 
bargaining and enforcement phases. Cooperation could be sabotaged by bargaining 
difficulties and / or a lack of enforcement. Economic sanctions involving multilateral 
cooperation involve two separate cooperation dilemmas: one between the sanctioning 
states and the target, and one between the primary sanctioner and other sanctioners. 
Without the support of an international organization, ad hoc coalitions of sanctioners are 
inherently fragile. International organizations are the coordinating mechanism for 
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reassurance and information. They enable governments to resist domestic pressure, and 
provide side payments to increase the value of continued cooperation [Drezner, 2000].  
- theorists in international politics assume that economically punishing sanctions 
are less likely to succeed against a nondemocratic target than they are against a democratic 
target. The reason for this conditional relationship is twofold. First, sanctions increase a 
leader’s ability to extract rents. Greater rents increase a nondemocratic leader’s ability to 
hold onto power, but greater rents do not increase a democratic leader’s ability to retain 
office. Second, the pressure to yield to sanctions depends critically on who is bearing the 
brunt of the costs in the targeted state. To succeed, sanctions need to target the regime’s 
winning coalition, the size and composition of which depend on a state’s political 
institutions. Against a democracy, where the winning coalition is large, economic sanctions 
are more likely to produce a policy change if they are relatively broad and affect many 
groups in society. Sanctions that are high in cost will generally have this effect. When 
dealing with nondemocratic countries, states should avoid broad sanctions that impose high 
economic costs on the population at large because most people in the country are not part 
of the autocratic leader’s winning coalition, so the economic costs imposed on the larger 
population do not translate into political costs for the regime. In brief, because 
nondemocratic leaders generally have a narrowly defined winning coalition, broad and 
costly sanctions will be less successful against them than against democratic countries. To 
make nondemocratic leaders yield, states must be able to impose narrow sanctions 
affecting the core groups supporting the regime [Portela, 2010]. 
Conclusions. 
Summing up the above mentioned we admit that economic sanctions as the foreign 
policy tool that prescribes the disruption of economic relations in order to coerce the target 
state to change disapproved policy. Theorists assume that the main goal of economic 
sanctions is to change target country’s behavior as desired by a sanctioning state. Thus, 
scientists suppose that compellence is the main aim which pursues sanctioning country. 
Other goals of economic sanctions are specific deterrence, weakening, international and 
domestic symbolism. Scholars are unanimous in the opinion that economic harm leads to 
political disintegration brought about by an unwillingness of the population in the target 
country to suffer economically because of internationally unpopular policy. 
It is determined that the key methodological issue of identifying the variables of 
the economic sanctions efficiency remains unresolved in international relations 
scholarship. It was found that none of the three schools discussed above has emerged 
uncontested through its capacity to provide an unequivocal answer to the puzzle of why 
economic sanctions in some cases fail to achieve desirable outcome. Generally, the study 
determined that the policy of economic sanctions effectiveness as a mechanism of the 
states’ national interests quarantee depends on the wide international political support of 
the sanctions on the part of the great states on all stages of their implementations.  
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It is provided by the coincidence of their national interests in the target country 
and foreign political attraction of the geopolitical surrounding states of the target country 
towards realization of the sanctioned measures. The policy of economic sanctions 
effectiveness also depends on such a factor as the formed normative and legal base which 
defines the principles and regulates the peculiarity of the policy of economic sanctions 
implementation related to the target country. The next factors are: institutional providing 
of the sanctioned measures realization; export and import dependence of the target 
country on the state-sanctioner which is often quaranteed by the previous positive 
political relationships between the state-sanctioner and the objective state. It also depends 
on the moderation of diplomacy goals the policy of sanctions is aimed at, which are to be 
corrected in the foreign political activity of the objective state but are not directed on the 
changing of political regime in the target country.  Additional factor is the presence of 
formed political opposition in the objective country which is oriented on the state which 
realizes the policy of sanctions, demonstrate readiness to satisfy its goals when the 
mechanisms of the population influence on making political decisions exist. 
Prospects for further research and development of the issues raised in this article are 
to conceptualize the determinants of the efficiency of economic sanctions which have been 
introduced against Russia for the annexation of Crimea, and for backing separatists in 
eastern Ukraine. 
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BEING AND CREATIVITY 
 
Abstract. This research presents the ontological understanding of creativity as an 
embodiment of human creativity in the structure of being. We have investigated the co-existence 
of a man with the world in the prospect of a moral attitude to the environment, whose 
ontological tension constitutes the act of creativity in the way of action. The subject of the study 
was creativity not as a separate type of human activity, but as a substantial feature of an event-
action, which can be modified in various types of activities. Methodology of dialogue of 
cultures, which was developed and tested in the literature, became the methodological basis of 
the research. 
 
 
Introduction. 
The phenomenon of creativity has attracted thinkers’ attention for a long time, and it 
has increased or decreased at different times and under different circumstances, but, in fact, 
it has never been lost. “Where did the creative initiative come to the world from?”, “What is 
creativity?”, “What is its meaning?” ... - these are the questions that have never stopped 
worrying the humanity. And if the theme of creativity seemed for some people “peripheral”, 
for others it became the main topic of research for many years of life. It gives an 
opportunity to think about creativity in the context of “perpetual problems”, perpetual, since 
people will never lose interest to themselves or to the world where they live. 
The search for the ontological means of creativity accompanies the entire history of 
philosophical thought, but at certain periods of society development, called “crisis”, the 
interest to the whole complex of problems connected with human being in the world 
intensifies. This happens because in such periods each person has to determine their position 
independently, make their own choices. Moreover, it is required not only from a narrow 
group of specialists, but from all humanity. Nowadays, the realities require deep thinking on 
the issue, why various kinds of creative discoveries and inventions are nowhere and never 
embodied completely in the way they were imagined and designed, but generate crises on a 
global scale. It is supposed that a way out of them should be found only in the sequence of 
what you are doing, creating, and not out of them. It is not enough to “know” how to create, 
it is more important completely different - how to be able to be the creator, how to be able 
to be - to exist in the world. 
  
